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We evaluate the asset pricing implications of a class of models in which risk sharing is imperfect because
of limited enforcement of intertemporal contracts. Lustig (2004) has shown that in such a model the
asset pricing kernel can be written as a simple function of the aggregate consumption growth rate and
the growth rate of consumption of the set of households that do not face binding enforcement constraints.
These unconstrained households have lower consumption growth rates than all other households in
the economy. We use household data on consumption growth from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure
Survey to identify unconstrained households, to estimate the pricing kernel implied by these models
and evaluate their performance in pricing aggregate risk. We find that for high values of the relative
risk aversion coefficient, the limited enforcement pricing kernel generates a market price of risk that























Consumption-based asset pricing kernels derived under the complete risk sharing, repre-
sentative agent (RA) assumption have a hard time explaining the observed large equity
premium (see e.g. Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Models in which the sharing of idiosyncratic
risk is limited have the potential to solve the puzzle (see for example Constantinides and
Duﬃe, 1996). In these models, the asset pricing kernel, in general, does not only depend
on aggregate consumption but also on the entire distribution of consumption across agents.
Diﬀerent models provide diﬀerent links between the distribution of consumption and as-
set pricing kernels. An important task is to evaluate whether these models are useful in
solving the equity premium puzzle. Recently some studies have done work along this line,
either evaluating several types of incomplete risk sharing models (see for example Attanasio,
Banks and Tanner, 2002, Brav, Constantinides and Geczy, 2002, Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002
and Kocherlakota and Pistaferri, 2006) or exploring the empirical link between asset prices
and higher moments of the consumption growth distribution (Cogley, 2002).
This paper contributes to this research agenda. It evaluates the asset pricing implica-
tions of a class of models in which risk sharing is imperfect because of the limited enforce-
ment (henceforth LE) of intertemporal contracts, as in Thomas and Worrall (1988) or Kehoe
and Levine (1993). No restrictions are imposed on the menu of traded assets. Alvarez and
Jermann (2001) have explored the asset pricing implications of LE in a two agent economy,
but they have not evaluated its empirical implications for the cross-sectional distribution of
consumption and asset prices. Lustig (2004) has shown that in a version of this model with
a continuum of agents the asset pricing kernel can be written as a simple function of the
growth rate of consumption of the set of households that do not face binding enforcement
constraints in the current state of the world. These unconstrained households have lower
consumption growth rates than households that face binding enforcement constraints. This
implication of the model allows us to identify unconstrained households as those in the
1lower tail of the cross-sectional consumption growth distribution.
We construct the LE pricing kernel using data on household consumption expenditures
from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) and evaluate its performance in pric-
ing aggregate risk. We show that the LE pricing kernel can be estimated using a simple
modiﬁcation of the standard RA pricing kernel. As documented in previous studies, the
RA pricing kernel only explains a small part of the equity premium. The power of the
LE pricing kernel depends crucially on how we identify unconstrained households but, in
general, it explains a larger fraction of the equity premium than the RA pricing kernel.
2 The Model
We consider a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents that face aggregate and
idiosyncratic endowment shocks, trade state-contingent claims to consumption on compet-
itive markets and face solvency constraints that limit the extent to which agents can go
short in these consumption claims. In this section we ﬁrst describe the underlying physical
environment and the market structure, then we deﬁne a competitive equilibrium and ﬁnally
we provide a characterization of the asset pricing kernel implied by this model.
2.1 Physical Environment
We denote the current aggregate shock by zt ∈ Z and the current idiosyncratic shock by
yt ∈ Y , with Z and Y ﬁnite. Let zt = (z0,...,zt) and yt = (y0,...,yt) denote the history
of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. We use the notation st = (yt,zt) and st = (yt,zt)
and let the economy start at initial node z0. Conditional on idiosyncratic shock y0 and thus
s0 = (y0,z0), the probability of a history st is given by πt(st|s0). Individual endowments
are given by et(st).
At time 0 households are indexed by their idiosyncratic income shock y0 and their initial
asset position a0. We denote by Θ0(y0,a0) the initial distribution of agents over (y0,a0); this
2initial distribution, together with the initial aggregate shock z0 serves as initial condition
for our economy.















where γ > 0 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and β ∈ (0,1) is the constant time
discount factor.
2.2 Market Structure









qt(st,st+1)at(a0,st,st+1) = et(st) + at−1(a0,st) (2)





−at(a0,st,st+1) ≤ J(a0,st,st+1) (3)
The solvency constraints, precisely spelled out below, are not too tight, in the sense of
Alvarez and Jermann (2000): a household that has borrowed exactly up to the constraint
(that is −at(a0,st,st+1) = J(a0,,st,st+1)) is indiﬀerent between defaulting on her debt
(and suﬀering the corresponding consequences spelled out below) and repaying (and thus
avoiding these consequences). In the standard complete markets model J(a0,st,st+1) = ∞,
since in that model households can fully commit to repay any debt they take on.2
Denote by V (a,st) the maximized continuation expected lifetime utility an agent can
2Of course, even in this model an appropriately chosen no-Ponzi constraint is needed to make the house-
hold decision problem well-deﬁned.
3attain, if she comes into the current period with assets at−1(a0,st) = a and faces constraints
(2) and (3). Furthermore let V Aut(st) denote the expected lifetime utility of an agent from
consuming the autarkic allocation ct(a0,st) = et(st) from node st on.3 Finally let ca
t denote










t(zt) for all zt. (4)
2.3 Equilibrium
We are now ready to deﬁne an equilibrium for this economy.


























maximizes (1) subject to (2) and (3).
2. The solvency constraints are not too tight, that is, satisfy, for all (y0,a0) and all st+1,
V (J(a0,st,st+1),st+1) = V Aut(st+1).
3. Market clearing: Equation (4) holds.
2.4 Characterization of Equilibria
Let (y0,a0) denote the characteristics of a generic household. In order to characterize
equilibrium consumption allocations and the pricing kernel we make use of cumulative
3The speciﬁcation of the outside option as autarky is done for simplicity. Any other speciﬁcation of the
outside option that is only a function of (a,s
t) gives rise to the same characterization of the asset pricing
kernel derived below.
4Lagrange multipliers {ξt(y0,a0)}, in the spirit of Marcet and Marimon (1998). In period
0 there is a one to one map between Lagrange multipliers ξ0 and initial wealth a0. Thus
let the initial distribution of Lagrange multipliers associated with the distribution of initial
wealth Θ0(y0,a0) be denoted by Φ0(y0,ξ0). Henceforth we will use the notation ξt(y0,a0)
and ξt(y0,ξ0) interchangeably. Over time these Lagrange multipliers increase whenever
the solvency constraint of a household binds, and remains unchanged otherwise. Crucially,
this implies that for all agents that are unconstrained in a current state, their Lagrange
multipliers all remain unchanged.
As shown by Lustig (2004) the consumption process of a given household is related to













and Φt is the cross-sectional measure over consumption weights (Lagrange multipliers)
ξt(ξ0,st) in period t, state zt.
To rule out arbitrage opportunities, payoﬀs in state zt+1 are priced oﬀ the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) of those agents who do not face any binding constraints
in transferring resources to and from that state (see Alvarez and Jermann, 2000). Let
UC(st,st+1) denote the set of these agents. The stochastic discount factor is the IMRS of
those agents with labels ξ∗
0 ∈ UC(st,st+1), who are unconstrained in state st in their sale









The risk sharing rule in (5) and the fact that for all unconstrained agents the consumption
5weights do not change ξt+1(ξ∗
0,st+1) = ξt(ξ∗
0,st) then immediately imply that the pricing













ht(zt) . Note that in the standard complete markets model the solvency
constraints are never binding, thus the distribution of consumption weights (Lagrange mul-
tipliers) is never changing, and consequently ht+1(zt+1) = ht(zt) and g(zt+1) = 1 for all










The only eﬀect of LE on asset prices is the component contributed by the shocks to the
cross-sectional distribution of consumption weights ht+1(zt+1)/ht(zt).
2.5 Implementation
In order to generate an empirical time series for the LE stochastic discount factor in (6)
from cross-sectional consumption data we need to estimate the aggregate consumption














6For all unconstrained households the consumption weight does not change in state st+1, i.e.
































where ga(zt+1) is the growth rate of aggregate consumption and gUC(zt+1) is the common
consumption growth rate of currently unconstrained households. Expression (8) suggests
that the term g(zt+1) can be measured using the consumption growth of unconstrained
households gUC(zt+1) relative to the growth rate of aggregate consumption. The key ques-
tion we deal with in the next section is how to identify unconstrained households in the
data.
3 Testing the Empirical Asset Pricing Implications
3.1 Data
The crucial diﬀerence between the RA and the LE pricing kernel is that the former can be
estimated using aggregate consumption data while for the latter we need to measure the
consumption growth rate of a speciﬁc group of households (the unconstrained). Therefore
household level consumption growth data is needed. The U.S. Consumer Expenditure
Survey provides such data since the majority of households sampled in this data set reports
consumption expenditures for at least two subsequent quarters.
We use quarterly data from 1980.1 to 2006.1. For each quarter t we select all house-
7holds which are complete income respondents and which report positive expenditures on
nondurable goods and services for quarters t and t + 1. For each household we then com-
pute quarterly growth rates of real (each component is deﬂated with speciﬁc CPI’s), per-
adult equivalent expenditures on nondurables (this includes nondurable goods and services,
excluding services from housing). We have a total of 307778 consumption growth rate
observations.4
The return data comes from the CRSP (the Center for Research on Securities Prices).
As stock returns we use the quarterly value-weighted return on the entire US market
(NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ), deﬂated by the inﬂation rate computed from the Consumer
Price Index by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bond returns are based on the average yield
of a 3-month US T-bill, again deﬂated by the CPI.
3.2 Empirical Construction of the Asset Pricing Kernels
The model predicts that in each period all unconstrained agents share the same consump-
tion growth rate, and that this growth rate is the lowest growth rate across all households.
So, interpreting the model literally, one could obtain ˆ g(zt+1), the empirical estimate of
g(zt+1) over the period 1980.1-2005.4, as simply the ratio between the average consump-
tion growth rate and the minimum (across households) consumption growth rate in a given
quarter. Obviously in the data there is signiﬁcant measurement error in consumption. Also,
consumption growth in the data is likely to depend on idiosyncratic events (for example
changes in personal health, or educational expenses) which are not explicitly considered
in our model. For these reasons this procedure would not be a very robust way of se-
lecting the relative consumption growth of unconstrained households. Instead we identify
unconstrained households as all households having consumption growth lower than a certain
4Due to a change in the household sample there are no observations in the last quarter of 1985. For more
details on the deﬂation method and on the categories included in nondurable consumption expenditures see
appendix A in Krueger and Perri (2006)















An important issue is how to set the threshold ¯ g(zt+1). We start with a natural initial
guess which is ¯ g(zt+1) = ˆ ga(zt+1) (so that unconstrained households in a given quarter
are all households who report consumption growth lower than aggregate growth in that
quarter); we also experiment with other possibilities. Once ˆ g(zt+1) has been constructed
using CE household data and deseasonalized, it is easy to construct a time series for the
LE pricing kernel according to (6). For a given risk aversion γ, time discount factor β and















where the aggregate growth rate of consumption is constructed using deseasonalized NIPA
consumption data.5
Below we discuss the asset pricing properties of ˆ mLE
t+1(γ,β) together with those of the
stochastic discount factor of the standard representative agent model, ˆ mRA
t+1(γ,β), which










5The deﬁnition of NIPA consumption used to compute the aggregate consumption growth rate includes
real expenditures on nondurable goods and services (excluding housing). It therefore includes the same
categories of consumption expenditures used to estimate the relative growth rate of consumption of uncon-
strained households.
93.3 Results
In this section we evaluate the performance of the two stochastic discount factors discussed
above in explaining the equity premium for diﬀerent values of the risk aversion parameter
γ and under diﬀerent assumptions for the identiﬁcation of unconstrained agents. For each
speciﬁcation (including the representative agent stochastic discount factor) we set the time
discount factor β so that the sample mean of the estimated stochastic discount factor E(ˆ m)
is equal to 1. With this normalization6 we can write fe(ˆ m), the fraction of the equity
premium that is being explained by the stochastic discount factor ˆ m, as






E [RS − RB]
= −Corr(ˆ m,RS − RB)cv(ˆ m)cv(RS − RB)
where RS
t+1 and RB
t+1 denote the gross real return on equity and a risk-free bond, and
Corr denotes the correlation coeﬃcient, and cv denotes the coeﬃcient of variation. Thus
to explain a large fraction of the equity premium we need a stochastic discount factor that
is negatively correlated with the equity premium and which has high percentage volatility.
The ﬁrst panel of ﬁgure 1 plots the realized excess return on equity RS − RB and the
representative agent stochastic discount factor ˆ mRA
t+1(γ,β) (in percentage deviations from
its mean) for a value of γ = 1.
The stochastic discount factor is indeed negatively correlated with the realized equity
premium but its percentage volatility is very low and hence the resulting fraction of the
equity premium it can explain is low. The second panel plots again the realized excess
equity return together with the limited enforcement stochastic discount factor ˆ mLE
t+1(γ,β)
for a value of γ = 1. Note how ˆ mLE
t+1(γ,β) is also negatively correlated (albeit less than
ˆ mRA
t+1(γ,β) ) with the realized equity premium but at the same time it is signiﬁcantly
more volatile than ˆ mRA
t+1(γ,β). With low risk aversion the higher (relative to ˆ mRA
t+1(γ,β) )
6This normalization essentially guarantees that all stochastic discount factors we consider are consistent
with the empirically observed risk-free interest rate.
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Figure 1: Stochastic discount factors (γ = 1) and realized equity premium
volatility of ˆ mLE
t+1(γ,β) is oﬀset by the lower absolute value of its correlation with the equity
premium so roughly the 2 discount factors have the same (low) explanatory power. With
high risk aversion though the diﬀerences in volatilities between ˆ mLE
t+1(γ,β) and ˆ mRA
t+1(γ,β)
are ampliﬁed and the limited enforcement discount factor can explain a signiﬁcantly larger
fraction of the observed equity premium.
Figure 2 plots the equity premium explained by LE stochastic discount factors estimated
in three diﬀerent ways and by the standard RA stochastic discount factor, as we vary
the coeﬃcient of risk aversion from 1 to 80. The diﬀerences among the three LE curves
lie in how we identify unconstrained agents. The curve labeled baseline is constructed
deﬁning unconstrained households in a given quarter as those with consumption growth is
below average consumption growth in that quarter. The other two LE curves (labeled 95%
and 105%) are constructed deﬁning unconstrained households as those whose consumption
growth is below 95% of aggregate consumption growth rate or below 105% of the aggregate
consumption growth rate. The ﬁgure also displays the average equity premium in the data,
which for our sample is around 1.8% per quarter. Notice how for low and moderate levels
















Average observed equity premium
RA model
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Figure 2: Quarterly equity premium: observed and predicted by models
of risk aversion all discount factors fail to account for a substantial fraction of the premium.
However, for higher risk aversion the LE model can explain a signiﬁcantly larger fraction of
the observed equity premium than the RA model: for example with a relative risk aversion
of around 60 the LE model can explain all the premium while the RA model only explains
half of it.
4 Conclusion
The consumption-based asset pricing model relying on the representative agent construct
has a hard time accounting for the observed equity premium. In this paper we assess how
introducing limited enforcement of inter-temporal contracts improves the empirical perfor-
mance of the consumption-based asset pricing model. In a LE model with a continuum
of households the standard stochastic discount factor is augmented by an additional term
12which depends on the consumption growth of households in the left tail of the cross-sectional
consumption growth distribution. The reason for this is that agents with low consumption
growth are unconstrained and thus it is their consumption growth, as opposed to the ag-
gregate consumption growth, which should price equity. We put forth a ﬁrst attempt of
measuring this extra term using household consumption data and ﬁnd that the LE pricing
kernels can account for a larger share of the empirically observed equity premium, relative
to the RA model. However, in order to account for the entire premium the LE model still
needs a coeﬃcient of risk aversion of around 60, which many would view as implausibly
large.
We interpret our results as mixed news for the asset pricing properties of the LE model.
On one hand they suggest that when one uses micro consumption data to evaluate the asset
pricing properties of the LE model results are not as satisfactory as, say, those obtained
by Alvarez and Jermann (2001) using a calibrated version of the model with two agents.
On the other hand the fact that the LE model performs better, along certain dimensions,
than the standard RA model suggests that making use of individual consumption data, as
opposed to just aggregates, might give us a better understanding of how aggregate risk is
priced.
Future work is needed to assess how a careful modelling of measurement error in indi-
vidual consumption growth would aﬀect the empirical estimation and performance of the
proposed asset pricing kernel, and to investigate whether the LE model can shed further
light on other well-documented asset pricing puzzles (such as the value premium puzzle).
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